Spillovers, Subsidies and Multilateral Cooperation
Addressing Concerns Over Industrial Subsidies. Bertelsmann Working Paper 29/02/2020 by Hoekman, Bernard & Nelson, Douglas
  
Working Paper 
Spillovers, Subsidies and  
Multilateral Cooperation 
Addressing Concerns Over Industrial Subsidies 
20 
  
Spillovers, Subsidies and Multilateral  
Cooperation 
Addressing Concerns Over Industrial Subsidies 
 
Working Paper – This Version: 29/02/2020 
 
 
 
Authors: 
Professor Bernard Hoekman, European University Institute & CEPR 
Professor Douglas Nelson, Tulane University
Contact 
 
Dr Christian Bluth 
Project Manager 
Global Economic Dynamics 
Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Telefon  +49 5241 81-81329 
Mobil  +49 173 73 42 656 
Fax  +49 5241 81-681329 
christian.bluth@bertelsmann-stiftung.de 
www.ged-project.de 
 
 
 
Cover:  nicknick_co – stock.adobe.com  
 Industrial Subsidies | Page 3 
 
Content 
Bertelsmann Stiftung and WTO Reform ................................................................ 5 
Executive Summary ................................................................................................ 6 
Introduction .............................................................................................................. 9 
1 Use of trade-related policies since 2008 ..................................................... 10 
2 Motivation for Subsidies ............................................................................... 15 
3 Gaps in WTO Rules ....................................................................................... 18 
4 Bolstering Disciplines for Subsidies and SOEs: Pathways Forward ....... 21 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 25 
References ............................................................................................................. 27 
 
 
  
Page 4 | Industrial Subsidies 
 
Abstract 
Negative international spillovers created by nontariff policies are a rising source of trade tensions and conflicts. 
The WTO does not include rules for subsidies for services industries, state-owned enterprises or investment in-
centives. Existing disciplines on industrial policies are increasingly seen to be inadequate by many WTO 
members. Efforts to revisit and expand rules for contested policies must recognize the changing nature of interna-
tional production. A first step in addressing trade conflicts associated with industrial policies is to determine where 
negative international competition spillovers are both large and systemic in nature. Doing so requires going be-
yond trade ministries and bringing in finance and line ministries, as well as competition agencies and international 
organizations with expertise in collecting information on subsidies and analyzing their effects. 
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providing reassurance to concerns of the membership at large with such forms of flexible cooperation and, finally, 
improving working practices in WTO Committees. 
We are grateful to Professors Bernard Hoekman and Douglas Nelson for their expertise and advice which have 
been a strong support for our WTO activities in general and for this paper specifically. 
 
Andreas Esche     Christian Bluth 
Director, Program Megatrends   Project Manager, Global Economic Dynamics 
Bertelsmann Stiftung    Bertelsmann Stiftung 
 
 
  
Page 6 | Industrial Subsidies 
 
Executive Summary1 
A central source of current trade tensions are national subsidy policies. This is not simply a ‘China issue’. Subsi-
dies constitute the great majority of trade interventions imposed since 2009. Data on non-tariff policies are 
notoriously patchy, as WTO notification requirements generally are only partially complied with, if at all. An inde-
pendent initiative that compiles data on trade policies, the Global Trade Alert, has documented over 20,000 policy 
measures affecting trade taken since 2009 by G20 members, with subsidies accounting for more than 50 percent 
of all measures.   
Any policy by a government that disadvantages one activity relative to another will have advantage the latter. It is 
therefore necessary to recognize that if the goal is to discipline policies that give rise to negative international spil-
lovers, the focus of attention must be on effects as opposed to narrowly defined policy instruments. The focus of 
WTO subsidy rules is on potential adverse effects of national measures on foreign products. A broad notion of 
actionable subsidies is used: measures that impose a direct burden on the government budget (including fiscal 
transfers through tax expenditures). To be actionable a subsidy must be specific (as opposed to benefitting eco-
nomic activity more generally), and convey a benefit to the recipients. Financial support for exports and local 
content requirements are prohibited.  
Historically, the center of attention of WTO members on subsidies has been agriculture, reflecting the extensive 
trade-distorting support provided by European countries in particular to this sector in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
main WTO instrument for non-agricultural subsidy-related policies, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervai-
ling Measures, prohibits export subsidies and regulates the use of countervailing duties to offset injurious effects 
of foreign subsidies on domestic producers.  The agreement applies only to trade in goods. 
WTO disciplines were crafted in the 1980s, before the rise of global value chains, the emergence of China as a 
major trading nation, and the growth in trade in services and the digital economy. They are outdated. They do not 
cover investment incentives or services activities. They leave unclear how to treat the activities of state-owned 
enterprises and whether such entities are a ‘public body’ or whether input subsidies or differential taxes that lower 
domestic prices of inputs are covered.  
Unlike tariffs, subsidies are appropriate instruments for many policy goals, but like tariffs they will generally have 
spillovers via effects on trade. To be successful, any revision of the international subsidy regime must rest on a 
clear understanding that the economics and politics of subsidies differ across polities; consider the goals that mo-
tivate their use; and the nature of cross-border spillovers they create. Virtually any significant policy action by a 
large trading economy will affect trade, often but not always unintended. The optimal response to spillovers will 
vary depending on the policy-maker’s objective function.  
WTO rules pay no attention to the objectives of governments using subsidies. There is no notion in the WTO of 
what constitutes a “good” subsidy. This contrasts with the EU and some recent trade agreements that recognize 
the legitimate role of certain types of subsidies and establish a presumption these are not objectionable. An eco-
nomic approach is used to assess whether a subsidy effectively addresses a market failure or objectives of 
common interest, balanced against associated negative effects on competition in the relevant market. An im-
portant feature is a shift away from rigid ‘hard law’ rules to focusing on the effectiveness of subsidies in attaining 
economic and noneconomic objectives and their effects on markets. 
The international subsidy regime can move in this direction through application of relatively simple, robust rules of 
thumb derived from the theory of economic policy. These recognize the right of nation states to engage in a wide 
range of domestically warranted subsidy policies, but also that conflicts will emerge over modalities and levels of 
                                                     
1 This note summarizes the main arguments of two papers by the authors: (i) Subsidies, Spillovers and Multilateral Cooperation; and (ii) Re-
thinking International Subsidy Rules. 
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acceptable competitiveness spillovers. Making such conflicts the subject of technical discourses focused on es-
tablishing the goal of a subsidy, whether it addresses a market failure, and whether trade spillover effects are 
necessary to achieve the goal may deflect much of the political heat associated with conflicts over inherently do-
mestic issues. 
A revamped subsidy regime requires participation of the United States, the European Union, and the People’s 
Republic of China – the three global trade powers. The rules must be seen as supporting the generalized gains 
from open trade and global production, not an attempt to isolate or ‘reform’ China. At the same time, China should 
accept that it has a leading role to play in the regime. The three majors should recognize that their political econo-
mies are consistent with a broadly liberal international regime even though they are, and will remain, profoundly 
different from one another.  
Accommodating system differences will be facilitated by distinguishing between competitive spillovers arising 
from policies to address global collective action problems and market failures and those stemming from national 
industrial policies. The former should be treated differently from the latter. A corollary is that governments must 
both elucidate their policy goals and cooperate in determining the magnitude and incidence of any cross border 
spillovers. A rule of thumb creating a presumption in favor of national treatment can narrow the range of conflict, 
as nondiscrimination will be more efficient in attaining policy objectives.  
This is not new ground for the WTO. An initial, time-limited effort was made to include a category of nonactio-
nable subsidies in the WTO, but this expired in 1999. It was too narrow, and did not distinguish subsidies that 
address (global) market failures from those that do not. It is past time that WTO members revisit what was started 
over 20 years ago. Preparing the ground requires a collective effort to measure and analyze the prevalence and 
effects of subsidies, using robust, transparent methodologies. A cooperative rather than adversarial approach is 
called for, centered on deliberation informed by a concerted data collection program and analysis.  
At this point in time, no international platform exists that brings together national Finance and Economy ministries, 
national competition authorities and international organizations concerned with the governance of subsidies. Buil-
ding bridges across these groups can help provide a basis for mutually beneficial cooperation on the use of 
subsidies and meaures to address the negative competitive effects of such policies. The more that the use of 
subsidies is treated as a technical, not a political, endeavor the greater the likelihood of an epistemic community 
on subsidy issues taking root. 
Development of a body of professionally competent, peer reviewable, internationally balanced work will generate 
common ways of talking about and thinking about the issue of subsidies. For all the differences in national econo-
mic and political regimes, a better understanding of the goals, prevalence and effects – and effectiveness – of 
subsidies may support agreement over time on good practice norms and standards.  As those become more wi-
dely accepted, national governments can legitimate subsidy policy internationally by adopting those standards.  
Delegation of both measurement and analysis to a trusted, neutral and technically capable body is critical to sup-
port the needed deliberation by states. The OECD has played this role for decades in producing comparable 
analyses of subsidy regimes in agriculture. This work illustrates the importance of going beyond documenting po-
licies to measure the magnitude of interventions using well-defined indicators. Producer support estimates played 
such a role in agriculture – analogous measures should be developed that are not sector-specific and permit mo-
nitoring and assessments of the economic incidence and effects of subsidy policies.  
Many international organizations collect information and monitor the use of different types of subsidy instruments. 
A joint initiative that encompasses the relevant specialized international organizations to develop and apply ap-
propriate measures and analysis of subsidy policies would provide the technical basis for more informed 
discussion and the design of cooperation in this area. The G20 Trade and Investment Working Group, an existing 
mechanism that includes the core international agencies and in which the major emerging economies are mem-
bers, could be the focal point of such an initiatve. 
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The WTO should provide a platform to members willing to invest resources into a work program to compile infor-
mation and analyze existing subsidy programs in systemically important economies, bringing together the 
epistemic community with expertise and interest in subsidies. This could include organizing regular thematic ses-
sions of the WTO Committee dealing with subsidies; creating a dedicated Working Party spanning different WTO 
bodies concerned with subsidy matters, including those where no rules exist presently (e.g., services); or laun-
ching a new plurilateral effort along the lines of the ‘joint statement initiatives’ launched in 2017 at the 11th WTO 
Ministerial Conference.  
A first step can be taken at the next WTO ministerial conference by launching a international work program on 
subsidies. This may be criticized as kicking the can down the road. It is not. WTO members simply do not have 
sufficient information to develop a common understanding of where new rules are needed and the form they 
should take. Calling a time out on the current focus on unilateral action and bilateral/trilateral talks to establish 
such an understanding is a necessary condition for keeping the WTO relevant in the 21st century. 
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Introduction 
It has become a platitude that we live in a supply-chain world. This has changed the relative importance (sali-
ence) of different types of trade and external policies. The organization of global value chains (GVCs) is very 
sensitive to transactions costs. Policies that raise (reduce) operating costs will lower (increase) the competitive-
ness of activities in specific locations and influence the allocation of investment. Participation in GVCs is 
conditional on low barriers to trade and efficient national regulatory systems that minimize delays in border clear-
ance and uncertainty with respect to the ability to enforce contracts, attain production quality standards and 
protect intellectual property. Policy design and international cooperation in a GVC world is more complicated rela-
tive to a world where goods are produced with domestic factors and inputs and supply chains are national. For 
example, production subsidies in one country (location) may have the effect of assisting production and exports in 
another. International specialization, in conjunction with the associated flows of FDI, attenuates the incentives to 
use traditional trade policy instruments (Blanchard, 2015; Gawande et al., 2015). 
 
While tariffs and related border policies become less effective as an instrument of industrial policy in a GVC 
world, governments continue to have incentives to support domestic firms and local employment, and firms con-
tinue to have incentives to lobby governments for assistance. Subsidies and subsidy-like interventions have 
dominated the post-2008 trade policy landscape. These types of instruments are used to target specific domestic 
economic activities deemed desirable from an economic growth and development perspective. This is nothing 
new. The motivations and pressures to assist domestic economic activity have not changed simply because the 
structure of international production has changed in the last 20 some years. What has changed – notwithstanding 
the pursuit by President Trump (“Tariff Man”) of an aggressive unilateralist trade policy – is the decline in the rela-
tive weight of traditional border protectionism in the trade policy of most governments. 
 
Analogous to tariffs and similar at-the-border protectionist instruments, domestic policies that support local eco-
nomic activity may create negative international spillovers. Such interdependencies become more prevalent – 
and more complex – in a GVC world. Important questions for policy are to determine the magnitude of the nega-
tive spillovers created by industrial policies and whether and how to redesign multilateral rules to discipline the 
use of measures that result in negative externalities for trading partners and the trading system. All governments 
pursue policies that affect the operation of markets. What has increased the political salience of industrial devel-
opment policies as a perceived source of negative spillovers for other countries is the rapid growth of China and 
views that large-scale subsidization of Chinese firms, especially state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is one reason 
for China’s success. 
 
A distinct feature of concerns about the implications of the rising share of China and other emerging economies in 
world production and trade is the role and prevalence of SOEs in these economies. An estimated 22% of the 
world’s largest 100 firms are effectively under state control (OECD, 2016). In 2018, Chinese firms accounted for 
22% of the list of largest 500 firms globally compiled by Forbes magazine.2 The five largest Chinese companies in 
the list – 20% of the top 25 global companies – are all SOEs. Many SOEs operate in GVC-intensive sectors, both 
upstream such as energy and downstream such as transport, and often are active in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (outward FDI). Concerns about the potential for SOEs to distort competition reflect views that SOEs 
are effectively subsidized (through soft loans, guarantees, preferential access to factor inputs other than directed 
credits, such as energy and land) and may indirectly subsidize downstream firms in both home and foreign mar-
kets through below-market pricing for their goods and services. In addition, SOEs may benefit from protection 
from foreign competition (e.g., reflected in FDI restrictions; joint venture requirements; preferential access to pub-
lic procurement markets, etc.).3 
                                                     
2 See http://fortune.com/global500/list/filtered?hqcountry=China. 
3 Empirical evidence for Chinese SOEs has documented that they have a lower cost of capital (reflected in lower interest rates on 
their debt) and that privatized SOEs continue to benefit from government support relative to private enterprises (Harrison et. al, 2019; Wood, 
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The US, EU and other WTO members argue additionally that China has put in place incentives for firms to invest 
rather than serve the market through exports and supports Chinese firms operating on international markets. The 
resulting trade tensions have led to the use of countervailing duties against Chinese exports and discussions 
among the EU, Japan and the US to identify gaps in extant WTO disciplines and ways to strengthen rules for sub-
sidies, SOEs and technology transfer policies. The trilateral discussions focus on suggestions to expand the 
existing list of prohibited subsidies in the WTO and to define SOEs as ‘public bodies’ to allow action against prod-
ucts that have used inputs provided by an SOE (e.g., intermediate inputs, credit). A general aim is to broaden the 
definition of what constitutes an actionable subsidy – e.g., open-ended financial guarantees; support for insolvent 
or failing companies with no credible restructuring plan; and preferential pricing for inputs such as raw materials 
and components.4 
 
A basic problem in the design of international rules for subsidies and related industrial policies is to strike a bal-
ance between the legitimate role of governments to support economic development goals and to address market 
failures on the one hand and the negative spillovers that that domestic policies may create on the other. This pa-
per reflects on these questions. We argue that elements of the current rules embedded in the WTO are no longer 
fit for purpose. We also make a case that the solution involves a shift in approach to recognize there are legiti-
mate reasons for governments to use subsidies. There is a strong case for WTO Members to launch a process to 
identify and assess the use of competition-distorting policies, and to provide a forum in which to discuss the im-
pacts and spillover effects of specific policies on investment decisions and trade. A precondition for determining 
whether new disciplines are needed, or old ones should be adapted, is information and analysis: empirical re-
search on the magnitude and incidence of negative international spillovers that are created by prevailing policies. 
Whatever the normative case for stronger multilateral rules on industrial policies, greater transparency (infor-
mation on applied policies) and assessments of impacts is needed to inform both domestic policy processes and 
the design of international cooperation (rulemaking).  
 
What follows starts with a brief summary of post-2008 trends in the use of subsidies. Section 2 reviews potential 
rationales for government intervention in a GVC-driven world economy. Section 3 discusses gaps in the existing 
rules. Section 4 turns to implications for the design of international cooperation aimed at reducing international 
spillovers and containing subsidy-related trade conflicts. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1 Use of trade-related policies since 2008 
Data on non-tariff policies are notoriously patchy. WTO notification requirements generally are only partially com-
plied with. Incomplete and out-of-date information applies even for measures that are subject to explicit 
commitments in the WTO such as export subsidies for agricultural products, impeding analysis of the effects of 
policies and the effectiveness of trade disciplines – see e.g., Hoekman and Messerlin (2006). The trend seems to 
be that WTO Members are notifying fewer measures and with greater delays. The percentage of Members that 
did not submit notifications on subsidies rose from 27% in 1995 to 44% in 2013 (WTO, 2014). Since then matters 
have not improved much. As of end-2018, 78 WTO members (out of a total of 164) had not made the subsidy no-
tifications that were due in 2017, 63 members had not made the notifications due in 2015 and 56 members had 
still to deliver their notifications due in 2013.5 
 
The lack of comprehensive notifications to the WTO by members puts much of the burden of policy data collec-
tion on third parties. A very useful source of data on the use of trade-related policy instruments is the Global 
                                                     
2019). More generally the evidence suggests that SOEs are less profitable and less productive than private firms in their respective sectors 
(e.g., Kowalski et al. (2013) for a broad sample of countries).  
4 See, e.g., Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States, Japan, and the European Union, 9 Jan-
uary 2019. At: https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/january/joint-statement-trilateral-meeting.  
5 See https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/scm_26oct18_e.htm. Collins and Wolfe (2010) and Karlas and Parizek (2019a) 
discuss the state of play in the WTO in this area. 
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Trade Alert (GTA).6 While GTA data only start in 2009 and are therefore skewed by the fact that policies re-
sponded to the financial crisis—we cannot compare post-2009 trends to the “baseline” use of different types of 
policies before the crisis – it provides valuable information on the relative intensity of use of different policies.  
As of end-2018, some 18,000 trade-related measures were included in the database, ranging from tariffs and 
quotas to antidumping and investment measures (policies affecting the ability of and/or cost for foreign firms to 
establish or maintain a commercial presence in a country). Of these, three-quarters were trade distorting and one 
quarter reflected actions to liberalize trade. The number of trade-distorting measures imposed each year between 
2009 and 2018 has been relatively stable, averaging some 1,350 measures per year. Governments were more 
active in removing trade barriers (implementing liberalization) in the years following the crisis. Since 2016, the 
number of liberalization measures demonstrate a declining trend. Tariffs and contingent protection (“trade reme-
dies” or “temporary barriers to trade”) accounted for 16.5 and 13.4 percent, respectively, of all measures 
classified as harmful by the GTA team that were implemented between 2009 and 2018. By far the largest share 
of trade-distorting measures took the form of subsidies to production or measures to support exports (Figure 1). 
 
The GTA distinguishes several subsidy categories, including state aid/production support and export support 
measures (including tax rebates and concessions). The most frequently observed firm-specific state aid 
measures are public sector loans or loan guarantees and tax or social insurance relief. Taken together, subsidies 
accounted for 52 percent of all trade-related measures implemented between 2009 and the end of 2018 (some 
6,900 measures).7 The G7 group of industrialized countries accounts for the greatest share of subsidies granted, 
while large emerging markets tend to implement more trade-related investment and price control measures 
(Evenett, 2019). Subsidies account for a much smaller share of total measures imposed by low-income develop-
ing countries. Insofar as subsidies are observed, they tend to target exports, suggesting a policy focus on 
promoting exports as opposed to protectionism (Hoekman, 2016a).8 
 
Figure 2 breaks down the use of measures depending on whether they target goods, services or investment. In 
the case of measures targeting trade in goods, the GTA database reveals that governments use tariffs actively, 
but this reflects a mix of protectionism and liberalization. Over the 2009-18 period, the countries included in the 
dataset implemented more liberalizing actions than protectionist ones: more tariffs were lowered than were in-
creased (first panel of Figure 2). A similar pattern applies for quantitative restrictions and non-automatic licensing 
requirements: the number of instances of removal of such measures slightly exceeds the total number of 
measures imposed over the decade. In contrast, trade defense measures tend to persist. The same applies to 
subsidy instruments. 
 
  
                                                     
6 The GTA website is at http://www.globaltradealert.org/.  
7 Note again that the focus here is on a simple ‘count’ of measures, not on the value of the support granted or their effects. Given that 
state aid/subsidies often are substantial in value terms, the implied share of subsidies vs. other policies may be a downward biased measure 
of the economic significance of such instruments.  
8 The WTO prohibits export subsidies, except in the case of agriculture, subject to specific commitments laid out in the Agreement on 
Agriculture, and in the case of developing countries with a per capita income of less than US$ 1,000. The observed pattern of export subsidy 
use post-2008 may in part reflect the greater leeway for low-income countries to use export subsidies. 
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Figure 1: Use of Policy Instruments (Total 2009-2018) 
 
Source: GTA website. 
Because it is difficult to subject services trade to import tariffs or temporary trade restrictions like antidumping (ex-
cept indirectly), it is not surprising that subsidies and other “non-border” measures are used relatively more 
intensively for services. For the sample as a whole, subsidies account for almost all measures pertaining to ser-
vices (second panel of Figure 2).9 Investment measures are the third most frequently observed measure affecting 
trade in services. The GTA data indicate that high-income countries make the most intensive use of subsidies, 
whereas lower-income countries rely relatively more on investment measures. Overall, countries appear to pur-
sue a policy of encouraging FDI—since 2012, the number of liberalizing measures has been greater than the 
number of harmful measures (third panel of Figure 2). Investment measures taken by lower income developing 
countries tend to be more weighted towards reducing discrimination against foreign firms; in OECD countries and 
upper middle-income nations there is rough balance between liberalizing and more discrimination. Evenett and 
Fritz (2018) note that in 2018 the number of restrictive investment measures, mostly taking the form of local con-
tent requirements, increased significantly. 
 
                                                     
9 In interpreting these data it should be recognized that services account for only a small share of total measures covered by the GTA 
database. The main focus of trade policy is on goods. 
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Figure 2: Measures affecting goods, services and investment, 2009-18 
 
Source: GTA website (accessed March 6, 2019). 
The United States is the “market leader” measured by number of new trade-distorting measures implemented 
during the 2009-18 period, followed by Germany and India (Figure 3). In the case of the US and India, this mostly 
reflects traditional border protection (tariffs, trade defense measures), while in the case of Germany export sup-
port measures play a big role (export credit; trade finance-related policies).10 China is generally a major focus of 
targeted measures. In many G20 countries, a high share of total imports from China are subject to trade barriers 
or affected by discriminatory policies (Figure 4). As noted by Bown (2019, this volume) China is the number one 
                                                     
10 Dawar (2019; 2020) discusses the (very limited) data available needed to form a judgement whether and to what extent export 
credit measures go beyond what is permitted under the OECD Export Credit Arrangement, noting that a major difficulty in this regard is that 
the Arrangement permits OECD export support agencies to “meet the competition” from non-signatory EXIM bodies, and the fact that the 
WTO rules in this area embody a carve-out for countries that have signed the OECD Arrangement.  
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target, reflecting efforts to manage Chinese competition and perceptions that “China Inc.” (Wu, 2016) engages in 
unfair competition and trade-distorting practices. 
 
Figure 3: New harmful measures imposed by country (total, 2009-2019) 
 
Source: Global Trade Alert (Feb. 29, 2020). 
 
Figure 4: Share of Chinese exports subject to discriminatory trade policies (%) 
 
 
Note: Data on the share of trade affected by a given intervention are adjusted by the number of days that the in-
tervention has been in force. Data encompass the 2009-2018 period. 
Source: Evenett and Fritz (2019; p. 38, Table 7.1). 
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2 Motivation for Subsidies 
Subsidies may be motivated by economic or non-economic goals. Economic goals include offsetting market fail-
ures (enhancing efficiency of resource allocation), inducing investment, shifting profits or rents, or redistributing 
income to disadvantaged communities or politically well-connected individuals or groups. A basic efficiency ra-
tionale for tax-subsidy schemes is to bring marginal private costs or benefits into alignment with marginal social 
costs or benefits. The need for this arises when externalities (market failures) cause social and private costs and 
benefits to diverge, so that private agents are not given an incentive to take into account the costs or benefits of 
their actions on others in the economy. Necessary conditions for a more efficient allocation of resources to result 
from intervention are that the market failures are diagnosed correctly and the policy addresses it.  
 
Any policy that has differential effects across sectors or activities will act as a tax or subsidy. Some policies that 
are sector specific may have an economy-wide objective. Examples include subsidies to sectors such as health, 
education, transportation, and communications. Conversely, policies that are economy-wide in scope may effec-
tively be industry-specific, for example, the pursuit of an environmental objective where the incidence of a 
measure is primarily on an activity that is associated with specific sectors. Many of the subsidy measures pursued 
by governments come under the heading of industrial policy. The traditional rationale for supporting an industry or 
productive activity has not changed for centuries. The premise of “infant industry support” is that the candidate 
industry is a positive net present value (NPV) industry, but the normal operation of the market will not support the 
establishment of the industry. A limited period of policy intervention can then create conditions conducive to the 
industry’s establishment. Two tests need to be satisfied for an activity to have positive NPV: the Mill test, which 
requires private positive NPV and the Bastable test, which requires social positive NPV – i.e., the costs of protec-
tion to society and any social benefits not captured in prices need to be taken into account when calculating 
profits. Any activity that passes the positive NPV test taking into account both social and private costs must be 
profitable, raising the classic question why the market does not invest in it, i.e., what is the market failure? Propo-
nents of industrial policy are rarely explicit about the source of market failure, but the details of the market failure 
are essential to identify the optimal form and level of intervention. The usual claims are that there are capital mar-
ket failures and dynamic externalities (e.g. linkages of some kind). These are arguments for temporary 
intervention. Baldwin (1969) pointed out that any market failure must be correctable with a finite period of inter-
vention. 
 
Thinking about the rationale for industrial policy has moved from an approach based largely on product market 
interventions (production subsidies, state ownership, tariff protection) to market failure-correcting taxes and subsi-
dies operating mainly on factor markets (R&D incentives, training subsidies, investment allowances, easing 
access to finance) and a focus on “interventions that help build systems, create networks, develop institutions and 
align strategic priorities” (Warwick, 2013).”11 Aghion et al. (2011) make a strong case for growth-enhancing sec-
toral policies that are competition and innovation-friendly and that aim at internalizing knowledge spillovers. They 
note that long-standing arguments for industrial policy continue to be valid —such as credit constraints that result 
in inadequate capital being allocated to high growth potential activities given that high-tech firms and start-ups 
often have limited assets and thus limited collateral to use to get loans. They also argue that the potential for cap-
ture and “white elephants” is reduced if industrial policy intervention and state aid is decentralized and targets 
firms located in different regions as well as sectors where there is more intra-sector competition, as this enhances 
the probability of a positive effect of sectoral state aid on export and innovation performance. In principle, such a 
policy should not differentiate between firms on the basis of their nationality.  
 
Standard economic frameworks for considering the rationale for government intervention continue to apply in a 
GVC world. Horizontal measures – a supportive business environment; investment in skills (education) and infra-
structure; rule of law and protection of property; safeguarding competition – arguably become even more 
                                                     
11 This observation is increasingly perceived not to apply to China, given recent trends towards growth in the size and market share of 
SOEs in the economy. 
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important. In a world of extensive value chain trade, firms must face a stable economic, legal and political envi-
ronment. At the same time there may be need for specific intervention to deal with coordination failures and 
information asymmetries. Interventions that expand the ability of a country to contribute to GVCs may have not 
only positive local spillover effects but improve the competitiveness of a GVC as a whole. This may be associated 
with positive as well as negative cross-border spillovers (Van Biesebroeck, 2009; Blanchard, 2015).12 The direc-
tion and size (distribution) of spillover effects will depend on linkages across countries within a GVC and linkages 
across chains—reflecting activities that may use the same type of inputs or demand similar products (Baldwin 
and Venables, 2015).  
 
Developed countries are primarily seeking to dominate frontier sectors. This will generally involve access to highly 
skilled labor, protection of intellectual property. In old-time development theory (“big push”) the emphasis was on 
locational externalities in production. In a GVC context locational externalities have more to do with creating envi-
ronments attracting and retaining skilled workers and, the skill-intensive part of value chains (Moretti 2012). Thus, 
subsidies to education (especially in sciences, engineering, technology) and to R&D and liberal immigration rules, 
especially for students and skilled workers, may play a role. Developing countries, by contrast, are seeking to 
connect with GVCs and “move up” the value chain through policies that support employment and upgrading their 
position in the value chain. Some of this will depend on efficient communication, transport and logistics services 
and networks. 
 
Policies that support (subsidize) local production of intermediate inputs can help attract value chain-motivated 
FDI, with the impact on GVC participation depending on the range of available input production capabilities in the 
host country (Baldwin and Venables, 2015). Reliable and low transactions costs for access to inputs and getting 
processed/final products into export markets is critical in a GVC world. While investment incentives are a potential 
instrument governments can use to offset specific locational or operating disadvantages, trade policy matters im-
portantly as well. Kimmitt and Slaughter (2015), for example, note that the limited number of trade agreements 
negotiated by the US meant that Audi set up a plant in Mexico instead of Tennessee, in part because Mexico of-
fered a location that had duty-free access to some 40 countries with which it had trade agreements.  
 
A key finding of research on strategic use of trade policy in the 1980s and 1990s is that governments can easily 
get policy wrong and reduce welfare. This applies equally to policy in a GVC world. For example, Bloningen 
(2016) examines the impact of policies to support local steel production on the export competitiveness of down-
stream manufacturing sectors that are significant users of steel. He finds that a one standard deviation increase 
in the use of export subsidies and non-tariff barriers leads to a 3.6 percent decline in export competitiveness for 
an average downstream manufacturing sector. But this negative effect can be as high as a 50 percent decline for 
sectors that use steel as an input most intensively. Conversely, policies that target downstream activities may be 
to the detriment of upstream suppliers, especially if the former have market (monopsony) power (Van 
Biesebroeck and Sturgeon, 2013).  
 
Cross-border spillovers 
Abstracting from the important question of the domestic welfare effects of government policies, from a global per-
spective what matters is the sign and size of associated international spillovers. These may be dynamic as well 
as static if national policies have longer term (anti-competitive effects on global markets. The extent of spillovers 
and their incidence is an empirical question that calls for analysis. Such analysis is pertinent for all countries and 
should consider the policies of all major countries.  
                                                     
12 McGuire (2014) documents how some countries have used selective government intervention to help national firms accumulate the 
necessary expertise and experience needed to build a niche in specific segments of the international global aerospace value chain, based in 
part on collaboration with global players in the industry. 
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An interesting implication of the differentiation in interests created by GVCs is that negative policy spillovers are 
likely to be between similar countries. Developed countries will have the same interest in frontier sectors and pur-
sue policies with the same goals. While these will be negative for other high-income countries, by strengthening 
value chains these policies may benefit developing countries that participate in them. Developing countries at 
similar levels of development will have similar interests and pursue policies with the same goals. These may gen-
erate negative spillovers for similarly situated developing countries, but the industrial policy competition will 
benefit (parts of) GVCs located in developed countries. This pattern of interests has implications for the institu-
tions used to manage spillovers and the rule structures involved in such management. 
 
Investment incentive competition between jurisdictions can lower overall welfare. Ossa (2017) provides an illus-
tration, analyzing the effects of investment-related tax/subsidy incentives at the state-level in the United States 
(US). US states “spend” some US$80 billion a year on tax incentives and subsidies to investment, reflecting a 
vigorous competition to attract investment. Ossa finds that this competition increases state-level welfare (by at-
tracting firms, increasing employment, and raising wages) but generates beggar-thy-neighbor effects. While there 
are large potential gains at the state level from subsidizing investment, this distorts resource allocation by making 
intermediate inputs too cheap and generating excessive entry. There is a significant cost to the US as a whole—if 
states were to cooperate and refrain from competing for investment, manufacturing real income in the US would 
be 3.9 percent higher.  
 
Figure 5: Potential negative spillover effects of subsidies on low-income exports 
 
Source: GTA database. 
Most assessments of the potential spillover effects on developing countries of foreign policies have tended to fo-
cus on measures implemented by the EU and the US. With the emergence of large emerging economies as 
major actors such assessments need to include these countries as well. Figure 5 plots the post-2009 trend in the 
share of products exported by a group of low-income countries that benefit from subsidies in Brazil, China and 
India.13 This share is substantial, ranging between 10 and 25 percent. It is also volatile for Brazil and India, as 
these interventions presumably in part reflect responses to macro-economic conditions (the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis). The overall share of potentially affected exports of the selected low-income countries is 65 per-
cent higher in 2018 for Brazil and India than it was in 2008 (before the crisis). Insofar as the rise in the spillover 
incidence of subsidies reflects a fiscal response to the macro shock, there seems to be a ratchet effect as well. 
                                                     
13 The affected countries comprise Afghanistan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, DPR Korea, 
DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. 
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This may be because other policy objectives are play or because governments confront constraints in removing 
subsidies once implemented.  
 
The basic point is that greater consideration should be given to monitoring and assessing the use and incidence 
of trade distorting measures and their possible negative spillover effects. Such efforts need to consider implica-
tions for – and operation of – GVCs as these involve firms and plants in many countries. 
 
3 Gaps in WTO Rules 
Many policies can act to promote an economic activity. Any measure by a government to disadvantage one activ-
ity relative to another will have the effect of advantaging the latter. It is therefore necessary to recognize that if 
one seeks to discipline policies that give rise to negative international spillovers, the focus of attention must be on 
effects as opposed to narrowly defined policy instruments. In the WTO context, the focus is on discrimination – 
domestic policies (subsidies, taxes, administrative or regulatory measures) that skew incentives for domestic 
agents to source locally. Often the instruments used to do this are tax-related and frequently take the form of tax 
exemptions or rebates that are conditional on local content.  
 
Art. III of the GATT requires that domestic policies satisfy the national treatment principle: this implies that behind-
the-border regulatory measures must apply equally to domestic and foreign goods. If this principle is violated, 
there is a de facto illegal subsidy. This broad notion of subsidy includes financial support: measures that impose a 
direct burden on the budget, are specific to an activity (as opposed to benefitting economic activity more gener-
ally), and conveys a benefit to those targeted. The focus of WTO rules is on potential trade effects, i.e., adverse 
effects on foreign products. A distinction is made between specific and general subsidies. Only the former are 
actionable. Specific subsidies include direct financial support for exports and local content requirements and other 
policies that reduce incentives to import.  
 
Historically, the center of attention for WTO members has been agriculture, reflecting the extensive support pro-
vided by many high-income countries to this sector. The Uruguay Round significantly reduced the ability of 
members to use agricultural subsidies and encouraged governments to decouple support from production. More 
recently (in 2015), WTO members agreed to a ban on agricultural export subsidies. Compared to the early 2000s, 
there has been a remarkable reduction in trade-distorting production support in high-income countries, illustrating 
the value and feasibility of cooperation to reduce the negative spillovers created by subsidies.14 Welfare consider-
ations enter only implicitly into WTO rule making. Thus, the preference for income support (assistance decoupled 
from production) and carving out such support through a “green box” of permitted subsidies was not because of 
recognition of national welfare implications, but because of the presumed lack of trade distortions associated with 
such support. 
 
The main WTO instrument regulating use of subsidies and actions by members to offset the competitive (trade) 
effects of foreign subsidies is the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM). This pertains 
only to goods – there are no disciplines on subsidies for services in the GATS. The ACSM has a two-fold objec-
tive. First, to prevent the use of subsidies by members to circumvent negotiated market access (tariff) 
concessions. Second, to regulate countervailing duties (CVDs) used to offset the adverse effects of foreign subsi-
dization of goods on domestic producers.15 Export subsidies are prohibited, but the WTO does not regulate 
                                                     
14 As of 2016 the trend towards decoupling appears to have stalled (OECD 2019a). 
15 Adverse effects include injury to a domestic industry, nullification or impairment of tariff concessions, or serious prejudice to the 
country’s interests. Serious prejudice is defined to exist if the total ad valorem subsidization of a product exceeds 5 percent; subsidies are 
used to cover operating losses of a firm or industry; or debt relief is granted for government-held liabilities. Serious prejudice may arise if the 
subsidy reduces exports of WTO Members, results in significant price undercutting, or increases the world market share of the subsidizing 
country in a primary product. The focus of WTO disciplines in cases of prejudice is on the amount of the assistance given, not on the extent to 
which a subsidy harms trading partners. 
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domestic subsidies per se (Horlick and Clarke, 2010). Subsidies other than export subsidies can be used but can 
lead to the imposition of countervailing duties in destination markets.16 The WTO rules are not concerned with 
why a government has implemented a subsidy, e.g., whether this can be justified by a market failure.17 Another 
important dimension of the rules is that remedies are retrospective – there is no scope to claim private damages.  
As noted in the Introduction, rising concerns about subsidies are correlated with the increasing weight of SOEs in 
the world economy. SOEs may be a source of subsidies for downstream firms and industries they supply as well 
as a potential source of concern for competition on markets in themselves. The WTO is not concerned whether a 
country has SOEs but focuses on whether SOEs engaging in trade (“state-trading enterprises” – STEs) operate 
on a commercial basis and prohibits discrimination by STEs. GATT Art XVII (on STEs) only requires firms granted 
exclusive or special trade privileges to abide by the nondiscrimination rules. Recent preferential trade agreements 
have gone further than the WTO in agreeing to disciplines on SOEs and offer insight into what participating coun-
tries presumably would like to see incorporated into the WTO.18 
 
The WTO disciplines were crafted in the 1980s, before the rise of GVCs, the growth of China and the emergence 
of the digital economy.19 WTO subsidy-related rules are premised on trade comprising goods that are produced in 
one country and consumed in another, and implicitly assume that most of the value added embodied in a product 
is generated by domestic factors of production. This is not the case today, making it less clear who benefits from 
a subsidy. Is the benefit associated with a GVC as a whole and the impact reflected in the price of the final good? 
Or is the impact on specific segments of a GVC? Who captures the benefit? In any assessment of such questions 
the first order of business is to identify and define the spillovers that are of concern.  
 
The exclusive focus on trade effects in WTO rules is arguably a downside of the status quo. One reason is that 
the rules do not cover investment incentives and related policies that are not conditional on local sourcing, i.e., 
that conform to the national treatment principle. Another weakness is that what constitutes a subsidy is unclear. 
The major example that has arisen in the WTO case law is whether an SOE is a ‘public body’. Another gap is the 
treatment of input subsidies. For example, the tax regime can be used to lower domestic prices of inputs used for 
domestic or export production. Yet another issue concerns the incentives for firms to petition for action to offset 
the effects of subsidies. Firms may not be willing to claim injury or adverse effects if they consider the overall bal-
ance of all the policies they benefit from, including in both the target country of a complaint and in third countries 
that contribute to or are part of their operations. Of course, from an economic perspective this is not a problem. 
The prospective nature of WTO remedies and absence of compensation for (private) damages is likely to further 
reduce the incentives for large firms (multinationals) to petition for cases to be initiated in the WTO by their gov-
ernments or to be willing (indeed, perhaps able) to document that they have been injured. Indeed, it may not be 
                                                     
16 De minimis provisions allow developing countries to use subsidies subject to certain thresholds. If the subsidy is less than two per-
cent of the per unit value of products exported, developing countries are exempt from CVDs (for LDCs the threshold is three percent). De 
minimis also applies if the import market share of a developing country is below four percent, and the aggregate share of all developing coun-
tries is below nine percent of total imports. The ASCM exempts nations with per capita incomes below US$1,000 from the WTO prohibition on 
the use of export subsidies and precludes CVDs on associated exports if global market shares are less than 3.5 percent for a product. De 
minimis provisions are also included in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, permitting support up to 10 percent of output in developing coun-
tries. 
17 In the Uruguay Round a third category, non-actionable subsidies, was included in the ASCM spanning environmental, R&D, and 
regional subsidies. This provision was time bound and lapsed at the end of 1999 because consensus could not be obtained to extend it. As a 
result, countries are left with GATT Art. XX, the general exceptions article, under which a WTO member can argue that a measure is neces-
sary to restrict goods made with prison labor or, inter alia to protect human, animal or plant life or health or conserve exhaustible natural resources. 
Art. XX was drafted in the 1940s and does not adequately cover many of the market failures that may justify policy interventions.  
18 Disciplines on SOEs are included in recent PTAs such as the CPTPP and the USMCA, and the relevant provisions are enforceable 
through dispute settlement procedures. These disciplines require that SOEs make purchases and sales on the basis of commercial considera-
tions; specify that subsidies granted to SOEs, both direct fiscal transfers and indirect subsidies, are actionable and that signatories may not 
discriminate in favor of SOEs (i.e., they must apply the national treatment principle). The agreements also include provisions requiring signa-
tories to list their SOEs and publish data on measures used to assist them.  
19 This and the following paragraphs draw on Hoekman (2016a). 
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clear in practice which country a multinational “belongs to” and thus which government to petition. The govern-
ment-to-government nature of the WTO is in this respect is another potentially constraining feature of the extant 
system that needs to be taken into account in re-assessing its salience.  
 
Policy cooperation is harder to design in a GVC world, given that the distributional effects and the efficiency (effi-
cacy) of interventions are more difficult to determine ex ante and the potential greater scope/need for targeted 
interventions to address coordination failures that may affect local participation in GVC activities. In the GATT the 
focus is on the domestic industry—as long as a sufficiently large share of the industry is in agreement that they 
are being injured by a foreign subsidy, action can be initiated. It has always been recognized that taking action—
imposing a CVD—will be detrimental to consumers and downstream users. But in a GVC world a CVD may have 
no effect on the firms that bring an anti-subsidy case for import protection. GVCs embody complex relationships 
between the links in the chain/nodes of the network to ensure reliability of supply, quality, interconnection, and so 
on. Domestic input suppliers may not benefit from CVDs on imported inputs that are processed locally and re-
exported. The CVD is unlikely to induce a lead firm to switch its sourcing to the local firms that bring a case – in-
stead the firm may simply move the affected part of the chain elsewhere if the CVD raises costs too much.  
 
Moreover, firms that participate in the value chain(s) will oppose CVD petitions. As noted by Hoekman and Mes-
serlin (2000) the political economy of trade policy reflects the balance of interests of firms depending on where 
they are located in the supply chain: users of inputs have incentives to lobby for measures that reduce their input 
costs. From an FDI-attraction perspective, permitting firms to launch CVD actions is likely to run counter to invest-
ment-promotion objectives and have detrimental impacts on the reputation of a country as a platform for GVC-
based activity. 
 
Incentives to attract investment are not covered by WTO rules. The focus of WTO subsidy rules is on whether 
interventions are export subsidies, or cause adverse effects for exporters in third markets or domestic import-
competing producers. But if the main goal and effect of GVC participation-related policies is to attract or retain 
FDI, the issue becomes one of investment diversion and global efficiency – cooperation aimed at preventing inef-
ficient competition between jurisdictions that simply generates rent transfers to investors as opposed to 
addressing a market failure. An implication of the centrality of FDI and more generally the importance of invest-
ment for GVC-related policy interventions is that discrimination may be less of a feature of policy so that national 
treatment is less of a constraint. Investors will operate plants that generate local employment, independent of na-
tionality of ownership. The spillovers that may arise are therefore somewhat different from the mercantilist 
motivation for many WTO rules—a concern about effects of policy on exporters. If the issue is investment incen-
tives, effects are not (only) on exporters but on locations for investment, that is, the potential problem is 
investment diversion. Non-discriminatory investment policies may be distorting by attracting investment to less 
efficient locations at the cost of other jurisdictions, generating non-trade spillovers the WTO cannot address be-
cause the rules do not cover such policies.  
 
Negotiating disciplines on investment policies is likely to be a very difficult exercise. One reason is politics: invest-
ment incentives are a favored tool of local governments. Another is the complexity of determining the 
distributional effects of interventions, which will center in part on identifying the counterfactual: what would have 
happened in the absence of a policy mix that led to an investment going to one location as opposed to some-
where else? In the WTO working group on investment (one of the so-called Singapore issues), it became clear 
early on that many (most?) governments were not willing to discuss investment incentives/subsidies, removing 
much of the potential rationale for a multilateral agreement (Hoekman and Saggi, 2000). Moreover, the high im-
port content of many GVCs means investment subsidies will benefit some foreign interests as well as local ones, 
reducing incentives to negotiate disciplines. Account also needs to be taken of the role played by services as in-
puts. If services benefit from government support, the indirect subsidies may dominate the net treatment of final 
products. On average, services account for one-third or more of the value of goods) (WTO, 2019). 
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4 Bolstering Disciplines for Subsidies and SOEs: Pathways Forward 
In considering how to update multilateral rules on subsidies and SOEs more attention should be given to the aims 
and effects of subsidies and enabling the use of subsidy instruments to address market failures. A basic need is 
to determine to what extent “gaps” in existing rules can lead to systemic negative spillovers. Coherence calls for 
such an effort to cut across existing GATT-GATS-sectoral silos and take a more competition-policy informed per-
spective, as opposed to a narrow legal focus on discrimination (national treatment), specificity and (re-)defining 
the definition of an actionable subsidy. There are lessons to be learned from the EU experience in this regard, 
where disciplines on state aid and SOEs are linked to competition policy and center on assessing/limiting the po-
tential distortions to competition arising from government intervention. 
 
A key input into any deliberation on rules of the road should be better data on the policies used by central and 
sub-central levels of government around the world – not just China. The GTA data discussed above suggest 
there is a lot of action, but what matters is to determine which of the many measures move the needle most. 
What creates large spillovers? What does not? What types of intervention are a serious problem from a global 
welfare perspective? Answering these questions requires a shift in mindset – away from closed-door discussions 
between like-minded countries (such as the trilateral talks between the EU, Japan and the US) towards an open 
process of deliberation based on evidence and analysis of effects. Such a process should encompass relevant 
entities in and outside governments that are concerned with implementing and/or monitoring subsidy programs. 
Tax and subsidy-related policy instruments fall under the purview of Finance and Economy ministries and execut-
ing agencies – generally sectoral line ministries and regional/municipal public bodies. An implication is that fora to 
identify, measure, assess and address the cross-border effects of tax/subsidy measures should go beyond trade 
ministries and those charged with implementing trade policy.  
 
In contrast to other areas of trade-related policy such as trade facilitation, intellectual property protection, sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures and product safety standards, there is no epistemic community (Haas, 1992) fo-
cused on subsidies.20 Many government agencies and international organizations are involved in the design and 
implementation of such policy instruments, with many professionals (primarily lawyers and economists) working 
on subsidy related matters, but there is international forum that brings these “stakeholders” together. Relevant 
players include national Ministries of Finance; national competition agencies (and in the EU, DG Competition in 
the European Commission), specialized agencies (e.g., the Australian Productivity Commission) and international 
organizations, notably the IMF and the OECD, but also sectoral organizations. Mobilizing an epistemic community 
that connects across these “silos” to focus on measuring support and determining the spillover effects of subsi-
dies could do much to prepare the ground for deeper cooperation in this area. This could start with agreeing on 
what types of data are already being collected, what more is needed, and foster the information sharing neces-
sary to build trust. Considering the use of indicators can help legitimate the overall program, as was done for 
agriculture by the OECD (the Producer Support Estimates).  
 
Such efforts will need an institutional anchor. The WTO is the obvious candidate although in the current environ-
ment it seems unlikely that the membership will be able to agree to give such a mandate to the organization. 
Alternative fora that might be considered as possible focal points include the G20 (working through the Trade and 
                                                     
20 See Hoekman (2016b) for a discussion of the epistemic community that underpinned the eventual successful negotiation of the 
2013 WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation. 
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Investment Working Group)21 or the International Competition Network (ICN), an informal grouping of agencies 
that cooperate in areas of competition policy.22 
 
To some extent, the major players in the global trading system have already taken initiatives that cut across silos 
in government and leverage the analytical capacity and knowledge base of international organizations to address 
subsidy-related concerns. A prominent example is the G20 Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity,23 an initiative 
established at the 2016 G20 summit in China. The mandate of this forum, facilitated by the OECD, included pro-
ducing and sharing reliable statistics on production, capacity and excess capacity across major steel producers, 
and identifying measures to reduce global production. Assessing the role of subsidies in generating overcapacity 
was part of the forum’s terms of reference. The forum provided a platform for the exchange of data on steel ca-
pacity, subsidies and other support measures, thus improving the information base and the transparency of the 
relevant policies implemented by major steel producing countries. The forum reported to G20 Ministers annually 
during 2017-2019 and met at least three times a year during this period.24  
 
Some of the elements for making progress are already embodied in different WTO agreements. These include 
the so-called green box approach used in the Agreement on Agriculture, which exempts subsidies that cause 
minimal distortion, understood to include programs such as direct income supports for farmers that are decoupled 
from production levels or prices, environmental protection and regional development programs. The Agreement 
also allows developing countries additional flexibilities in providing domestic support.25 The various de minimis 
provisions included in these WTO agreements for developing countries are a way of recognizing that the spillover 
effects created by subsidies used by low-income countries are likely to be small from a systemic perspective. The 
‘green box” approach in the Agreement on Agriculture and included on a provisional basis in the ASCM (and that 
expired in 1999) illustrate the possibility of balancing stronger disciplines on subsidies with a recognition that 
some types of subsidies are unlikely to affect trade. Going beyond this to recognize that some subsidies may 
have an important function in addressing market failures and launching a concerted effort to improve information 
on tax/subsidy policies targeting investment in industrial and service sector activities arguably are necessary con-
ditions for making progress in additional rule making.  
 
Many WTO members have emphasized the need for better information on subsidies. The recent focus in the 
WTO by the US, EU and others on the problem created by inadequate notification has made clear this is a prob-
lem. However, the suggested remedies – addressing the notification deficit by imposing stronger penalties for late 
or incomplete reporting by members – is unlikely to do much to improve matters. More effective would be to cre-
ate positive incentives for greater transparency by governments (Wolfe, 2017; Wolfe, 2018). Sharing experiences 
on the payoffs from a national governance perspective of compiling better information; provision of technical as-
sistance and identification of good practices; using web-scraping techniques to collect data on policies from 
government websites and public reporting by companies and the specialized press (a source of information used 
by the GTA); and leveraging extant data collection efforts by ministries of finance would do much to fill the gaps. 
                                                     
21 The G20 Trade and Investment Working Group (TIWG) was created in 2015 as a forum to prepare the ground for trade initiatives by 
G20 members. It includes the main international organizations, i.e., the IMF, OECD, World Bank, International Trade Centre, UNCTAD and 
the WTO. The TIWG provides a forum for coordination of the activities of the organizations in areas defined by G20 members. Activities of the 
TIWG have centered on the importance of reducing trade costs for global value chains; policies to address adjustment costs of globalization; 
and investment facilitation. Work orchestrated by the TIWG helped prepare the ground for the launch of plurilateral discussions on e-com-
merce and investment facilitation in the WTO. 
22 The ICN was formed in 2001 by national competition agencies in part as a consequence of the effort to launch negotiations on com-
petition policy in the WTO in the early 2000s. See Kovacic and Hollman (2011). 
23 See, e.g., http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2018/global-forum-on-steel-excess-capacity-180920.pdf and https://www.meti.go.jp/eng-
lish/press/2019/1026_001.html. For an economic analysis of subsidies and excess capacity, see Bloningen and Wilson (2010). 
24 The forum allowed participants to identify the underlying causes of steel overcapacity and define concrete actions to address them. 
See https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2077.  
25 See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.htm 
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Given the incentive problems associated with reliance on firms to report perceived problem policies and docu-
ment their effects, options that rely on other actors – including other international organizations – are more likely 
to be effective.  
 
A successful example of the type of approach needed is the long-standing effort that commenced in the late 
1970s to measure the extent and effects of policies supporting the agricultural sector (see Legg and Blandford, 
2019 and Wolfe 2020). This resulted in the development of summary indicators such as the Producer Support 
Estimate (PSE) that have become a core element of monitoring policy in this sector and acted as a focal point for 
policymakers to reflect on the overall magnitude and incidence of a broad array of policy measures used to sup-
port agriculture. Other, more recent, examples that are directly pertinent to the issue of industrial subsidies 
include the Global Steel Forum mentioned above and the OECD’s detailed firm-level sector-specific study of the 
magnitude and incidence of subsidies along the aluminium supply chain (OECD, 2019c).26  
 
Data are necessary but not sufficient. Analysis of effects is as important. Ideally, such analysis would be provided 
by the WTO secretariat and provide a basis for discussion among members. The Trade Policy Review Mecha-
nism provides a possible framework on which to build, as it is intended to inform periodic deliberations in the 
WTO on country-specific policies – with WTO Members with the largest shares of world trade being discussed 
more frequently (every 2 years) – as well as discussion that focuses on developments in the trading system more 
generally. The latter was something done in the GATT years and that was resuscitated after the 2008 financial 
crisis as a means of monitoring the use of policy responses by WTO members. A central feature of the TPR pro-
cess is peer review – it is left for members to engage with each other on the basis of the factual report prepared 
by the secretariat. There is relatively active participation in the TPR process (Karlas and Parizek, 2019b). Such 
review would benefit from more analysis by the secretariat of the effects of policies, something which is precluded 
at present. 
 
A core challenge in defining possible rules is to agree on what in principle constitutes desirable (globally welfare-
enhancing) policies and what types of subsidies are more likely to generate undesirable spillover effects, based 
on empirical analysis and evidence. In thinking about moving forward, there may be lessons from the EU in en-
suring a level playing field for firms on its integrated market. In the EU, subsidies are covered by EU competition 
policy disciplines. Four criteria apply for state aid to be illegal: (i) state resources (a subsidy or tax expenditure) 
lead to (ii) a selective advantage for a firm or activity that (iii) distorts competition and (iv) affects trade between 
Member States. These criteria apply to undertakings to which Member States have granted special or exclusive 
rights, i.e., SOEs. EU Member States must comply with transparency obligations for State aid allocations over 
€500,000, including the name of the beneficiary and the amount of aid granted.27 This data compilation effort is 
complemented by evaluation of selected large State aid schemes to assess their impact and guide possible im-
provements in the design of programs as well as the subsidy rules.  
 
A central feature of the EU approach to regulating subsidies is that measures falling under a General Block Ex-
emption Regulation (GBER) are deemed to raise few or no concern in distorting competition on the EU market. 
These include regional aid (including for ports and airports), aid for SMEs, aid for R&D and innovation, broadband 
infrastructures, energy and the environment, employment and training, natural disasters, sports and culture. 
Agreeing to a set of subsidies that are deemed not to cause spillover concerns along the lines of what is done by 
the EU could help differentiate between subsidies that are not considered to have harmful trade spillover effects 
                                                     
26 See OECD (2019b) for a short summary of information on government support and approaches used to collect such data. 
27 An annual State Aid Scoreboard (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/index_en.html) collects data reported by 
Member States. It covers all existing aid measures to industries, services, agriculture and fisheries except for aid to railways and services of 
general economic interest. In 2017, Member States spent €116.2 billion, or 0.76% of total EU GDP, on State aid. Over 90 percent of total 
State aid was allocated to horizontal objectives of common interest, such as environmental protection, research, development and innovation 
and regional development. 
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and those that may have such consequences and should be actionable.28 Following a 2012 reform, EU Member 
States are no longer required to notify State aid in advance to the Commission if the measures fall under the 
GEBR, leaving the Commission to focus on measures that are deemed of greater risk of distorting competition. In 
2017, most new aid measures fell under the GBER. The quid pro quo for no longer having to notify ex ante is 
stronger controls at Member State level, greater transparency and better evaluation of the impact of state aid. 
 
Competition policy informed approaches 
A major feature of the “WTO approach” to subsidies (and more generally towards trade policies), is hard law, 
mercantilism (a focus on exports/market access) and reliance on self-interest of firms to complain to governments 
and request either CVDs or to raise the matter in the WTO. To effectively address the interface challenges posed 
by subsidies and related industrial policies, this focus arguably is too narrow. A more competition policy-based 
approach that is geared to competition considerations (competitive neutrality; contestability) as opposed to for-
eign market access is called for. This can draw on some of the basic concepts and approaches used in the EU, 
including agreement that some types of policies are prima facie “OK” (the block exemption or “green box” ap-
proach discussed above) and use of competitive neutrality principles to address concerns that state aids and 
SOEs may distort the operation of markets. Moving in this direction does not require a supranational body – a 
more competition-centric approach can be applied in an inter-governmental setting like the WTO.  
 
The design and enforcement of competition law and policy is distinctive compared to trade law and policy in rely-
ing to a much greater extent on economic analysis. Recognizing the need to balance the potential market failure 
motivations for subsidies against the potential spillover effects on competition often will call for theoretically 
grounded empirical analysis. Simple heuristics or per se rules may be too blunt. Complementing “black letter” law 
approaches with a “law and economics” approach as in the implementation of competition policy could help WTO 
members by avoiding a head-on confrontation between countries with different economic systems – i.e., the 
“China Inc.” problem (Wu, 2016). An example is provided by current claims that Chinese SOEs engage in essen-
tially predatory behavior: using their privileged status and access to capital and other resources to undercut the 
international competition. We know what conditions have to apply for such a strategy to be profitable – there must 
be high entry barriers or large dynamic economies of scale and learning that preclude firms from (re-)entering 
markets. The economic literature has found that SOEs are on average less productive and profitable (Kowalski et 
al. 2013; OECD, 2016; Harrison et al., 2019). Presumably insofar as there are significant subsidies allocated to 
SOEs these will not be permanent as this would be a recipe for recurring losses. In the long run these cannot be 
sustained. These types of considerations should enter into discussions on possible rules to address the potential 
negative effects of SOEs operating on global markets. We can note again that EU competition rules apply to 
SOEs. The EU does not care about ownership but about behavior. The same should apply in the WTO setting: 
we should care about constraining potential long-term anticompetitive effects. This cannot be done using the cur-
rent rulebook, which is a major gap. 
 
Another design element that arguably needs reconsideration concerns the entities that are expected (required) to 
challenge perceived anti-competitive practices. There may be a need to shift the burden away from firms and the 
associated focus on their trade interests as opposed to national or global welfare. There is a case for creating a 
mechanism through which matters of “systemic” import can be brought on behalf of the trading system. In the EU, 
                                                     
28 The EU treaty includes a public services exception (Art. 106 TFEU) which specifies that undertakings “entrusted with the operation 
of services of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly” are subject to the competition rules of the 
Treaty “insofar as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance . . . of the particular tasks assigned to them.” TFEU Art 
107(3) lists measures that may be considered to be compatible with the internal market: (a) aid to promote the economic development of ar-
eas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment….(b) aid to […] to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State; (c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic ar-
eas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest; (d) aid to promote culture and 
heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the Union to an extent that is contrary to the com-
mon interest; (e) such other categories of aid as may be specified by decision of the Council on a proposal from the Commission. 
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the European Commission may act as an agent to defend the interests of the majority of the principals (member 
states) if one member takes actions that impede the operation of the single market. Given the sovereignty con-
cerns of all WTO members and enormous heterogeneity across the 164 members there is no prospect of the 
WTO secretariat playing such a role, even on a limited scale. More feasible may be to agree on creation of pro-
cesses to identify instances of large spillovers that are of systemic concern. Bolstering the Trade Policy Review 
(TPR) process is one possibility. Another is to relax the constraints imposed on the WTO secretariat to act as an 
agent of transparency (Mavroidis and Wolfe, 2015). Yet another would be to establish an “Ombudsman” type 
body that is mandated undertake and publish analytical assessments of the policies that have systemic impacts 
(Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2000). These possibilities may seem like a bridge too far, especially in an environment 
where geo-economic tensions are high, but the same was true when the TPR mechanism was first proposed in 
the Uruguay Round and when the FAO and the OECD commenced analytical work to measure the magnitude of 
support provided to agriculture. Incremental steps allowing learning by doing should be feasible with a minimum 
of good will – or a modicum of credible threats of dissolution of multilateral cooperation. 
 
Conclusion 
The global economy has become much more integrated in recent decades as a result of the political decision by 
China to adapt an outward-oriented development strategy, extensive trade and investment liberalization by nu-
merous countries, and technological advances. The rise of GVCs is both a response to and driver of global 
integration. It has changed the policy mix used by many WTO members – not just China. Tariffs – notwithstand-
ing Tariff Man Trump – are no longer an important policy tool. The emphasis today is on subsidies broadly 
construed. Policy cooperation has become more complex than in the 1980s, the last time WTO rules were re-
considered, when trade involved less vertical specialization and the pattern of unbundling of production activities 
across many locations that prevails today.  
 
The current trade conflicts and tensions illustrate the need to revisit the rules. This should start with bolstering 
transparency through a collective effort to collect and compile information on subsidies, going beyond reliance on 
notifications by countries, and to launch a process of dialogue and deliberation in the WTO to define a negotiating 
agenda. Better data on applied policies is important to help countries determine whether there are serious, sys-
temic spillovers. Analysis centered on spillovers is needed to inform deliberation on addressing lacunae in the 
rules. Filling the information gap will require a shift in prioritization of the transparency and monitoring efforts of 
international organizations, not just the WTO, and a concerted effort to map the nontariff measures that are used 
by governments to affect/target investment and economic activities in their jurisdictions.  
 
When it comes to rule-making efforts the basic question should be: what generates major systemic spillovers? 
Determining the answer implies also identifying policies that are (should be) of less concern. The traffic 
light/green box approach is already an element of the WTO rules for agricultural policies. Extending this by build-
ing on the example of block exemptions coupled to/with notification would seem to be a reasonable path to 
pursue. This will also permit differentiation across WTO members – e.g., by agreeing to de minimis provisions for 
specific sets of countries or facilitating the process of request and obtain waivers. The foregoing discussion of the 
changing incentives and incidence of subsidy-type policies in a GVC world suggest there is cause to revisit sali-
ence of “national treatment” and the WTO focus on “discrimination” as the key tests for adverse effects.  
 
Making progress in updating the rules of the game for subsidies and associated sources of potential cross-border 
spillovers such as the behavior of SOEs requires deliberation that includes the major trading powers – those ca-
pable of generating negative externalities that are of systemic importance. Preparing the ground is a complex 
undertaking, as it requires recognition that subsidies may promote efficiency by helping to address market failures 
and overcome collective action problems – e.g., dealing with climate change. A law and economics approach is 
called for, akin to what has gradually emerged in the area of competition law (Hoekman and Nelson, 2020). De-
signing such an approach requires deliberation between – and support of – the various actors in- and outside 
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government that are involved in the design and implementation of subsidies and responsible for ensuring that 
markets are competitive. 
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